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State Summary
All of the information below pertains to audit legislation that passed in 2008. However, these statutes were dependent on simultaneous implementation of new voting systems that produced voter-verifiable paper records. Such machines were initially scheduled to be in place by January of 2009, but later legislation halted the purchase of new voting systems until funding for such systems could be guaranteed. See Section 19:48-1, “Voting machines, requirements,” Subsections b (1) and b (2): http://law.onecle.com/new-jersey/19-elections/48-1.html.
Given this delay, no audit can currently be conducted in New Jersey, as the current voting system consists only of paperless DRE machines that produce no auditable record.
All citations below, except where noted, are from the New Jersey Statutes, Title 19, Section 19:61-9, “Audits of election results”: http://law.onecle.com/new-jersey/19-elections/61-9.html.
Any procedure designed, adopted, and implemented by the audit team shall be implemented to ensure with at least 99% statistical power that for each federal, gubernatorial or other Statewide election held in the State, a 100% manualrecount of the voter-verifiable paper records would not alter the electoral outcome reported by the audit. For each election held for State office, other than Governor and Lieutenant Governor, and for county and municipal elections held in 100 or more election districts, any procedure designed, adopted, and implemented by the audit team shall be implemented to ensure with at least 90% statistical power that a 100% manual recount of the voter-verifiable paper records would not alter the electoral outcome reported by the audit. Such procedures designed, adopted, and implemented by the audit team to achieve statistical power shall be based upon scientifically reasonable assumptions, with respect to each audited election, including but not limited to: the possibility that within any election district up to 20% of the total votes cast may have been counted for a candidate or ballot position other than the one intended by the voters; and that the number of votes cast per election district will vary. Such procedures and assumptions shall be published prior to any given election, and the public shall have the opportunity to comment thereon.
If the audit reveals that a candidate’s share of votes cast has been altered by more than 1/10 of 1 percent, the Audit Team will expand the audit to the same number of election districts included in the initial audit. If the initial audit pool comprises more than ½ of all election districts included in the race, all remaining precincts will undergo an audit. The Audit Team has the right to expand the audit even further if they feel necessary after the second round of audits
Districts must be selected no later than 24 hours after the election, and audit must be completed before certification.
Yes

